the "Orientalist" mask of Asia, defining an identity that assumes a singular inclination that -considering its free interaction with several cultural traditions -could be defined as a difficult and problematic effort towards a "decolonial" option V . In such a framework it is interesting to question the direction given by the regionalisation process to local identity(ies) beyond the former path of "Asian values".
1.
Before focusing on "ASEAN values" it is interesting to remember how several intellectuals underlined the absence of theoretical foundation of "Asian values" ideology and its relation to a sort of "orientalist-occidentalist" schema VI . Asia, as a distinct region of the world, is a product of European thought VII . After the collapse of Eurocentric world system, if it could be useful from a conventional point of view to continue to use such a concept in geography, in any case it could be use to define an homogeneous civilisation or culture VIII . As stated by Amartya Sen in the Nineties :
"There are no quintessential values that apply to this immensely large and heterogeneous population, that differentiate Asians as a group from people in the rest of the world. The temptation to see Asia as one unit reveals, in fact, a distinctly Eurocentric perspective. Indeed, the term "the Orient", which was widely used for a long time to mean essentially what Asia means today, referred to the direction of the rising sun. It requires a heroic generalization to see such a large group of people in terms of the positional view from the European side of the Bosporous" (Sen 1997, 13) .
Thus the idea that there are some values -community (or group), social harmony, individual duty, family ties, etc. -opposed to western ones -individual, individual freedom, individual right, atomistic family, etc. -more than a manifestation of a "Asian" or "East
Asia" common culture is to be considered a kind of "Reversed Orientalism"
IX . There are specific political reasons that allowed the rise of such an "Asian values" discourse. The leader of East-Asia countries, in fact, starting from the Eighties and continuing in the Nineties, tried to use a European concept against the growing western (American) influence in the region (Sen 1997, 28-29) . At the same time the concept has been used in order to justify restriction on the individual and press freedom to sustain the paternalistic authority of the government in several ASEAN states (eg. Malaysia and Singapore; see Bloom 2016, 82-83) . From this point of view the "Asian Values" discourse represents an example of that kind of political action that can be implemented throughout the new use of a concept, a manifestation of such a "thinking in a political mode" that -theorised by Quentin Skinner -aims to change the constraint on an action through the manipulation of certain normative terms (Visone 2014, 82-83) . But such a discourse concretely worked? E -5 involve the end of a debate on a regional identity that today assumes a new fundamental political and cultural dimension, avoiding the "orientalist" idea of a quintessential traditional unity among Asian cultures. In particular, according to Bilahari Kausikan, the debate concerning architecture of East Asia will become fundamental in order to define, in a more nuanced way, an original path for a region seeking a new identity (Kausikan 2014).
Far more than being just a geopolitical issue -beyond the same Kausikan statements -it is possible to stress how ASEAN principles (juridical and cultural) are playing an important role in (re)defining, in an original way, the regions political identity.
2.
In effect if we look to the ASEAN Charter (2008), we will find some interesting affirmations that could support the creation of a political and cultural identity for the South East Asia community. In terms of decision-making the Charter -in article 20, clause 1 -established that "As a basic principle, decision-making in ASEAN shall be based on consultation and consensus" What is interesting about such an article in the logic of this paper is, more than its evident distance from comparable western charters such as the EU Charter of fundamental rights, its idea to balance -in a system that focuses on the promotion and protection of human rights -freedoms and responsibilities XXII . The attempt of article 6, as of the whole ADHR, was to find a point of encounter among the main cultural traditions acting inside the present regional social life. 
3.
In From this point of view, the creation of a less inter-governmental and more participated ASEAN institutional framework will be decisive in determining what will finally be attained by such an ongoing process concerning the building of a de-colonial (beyond the dialectic West/East) regional identity. Until that moment the ASEAN Way will remain hostage to the precarious equilibriums among national governments. In effect, if there is a "Eurocentric" myth that must be still abandoned in the region, it is that of Nation-State's absolute sovereignty XXVII . But, in this realm, the ASEAN appears still far from the embodiment of an original and de-colonial solution. 'età delle ideologie (1929-1939 (1929) (1930) (1931) (1932) (1933) (1934) (1935) (1936) (1937) (1938) (1939) , ETS, Pisa, 2015. I The aims of the association have been defined in seven Bangkok Declaration points: "1. To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavors in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of South-East Asian Nations; 2. To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter; 3. To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields; 4. To provide assistance to each other in the form of training and research facilities in the educational, professional, technical and administrative spheres; 5. To collaborate more effectively for the greater utilization of their agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade, including the study of the problems of international commodity trade, the improvement of their transportation and communications facilities and the raising of the living standards of their peoples; 6. To promote South-East Asian studies; 7. To maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing international and regional organizations with similar aims and purposes, and explore all avenues for even closer cooperation among themselves." (The ASEAN Declaration, 1967) . II Of course such a "process" in Europe is facing a radical crisis (Balibar 2016, 11-32) . III As stated by Elena Poli also after the 1997 crisis -which showed to ASEAN's elites the necessity to look with major interest to EU model -the differences among the two political and economic entities remains conspicuous and will continue to persist in future (Poli 2014, 9) . On the debate for the future of ASEAN see also Masini 2015.
 Dr Tommaso Visone is Adjunct Professor in Political Thought for Colonization and Decolonization
IV For an introduction to the concept of Asian Values see Monceri 2002. V I use this concept according to Hamid Dabashi's statement that says "The Orient they" Europeans "had created, the Third World they had crafted to rule and denigrate, have disappeared. If only those who still see themselves as Orientals would begin to decolonize their mind too". In trying to find an original "Asean way" the people of South East Asia are defining a new singularity that does not correspond to old mechanism as "Europe/Asia" or "West/East". In this sense they began to "decolonize" their mind. See Dabashi 2015, 11. VI E.g. see Rošker 2016, 153-164; Tew 2012, 12; Yau Hoon 2004, 154-174 . VII An invention that finds its origins in the Greek mythology and that was, only in contemporary history, adopted by the same Asian elites (Markovits 2013: 53-66) . VIII Asia could also be conceived as a political concept but, in such a case, its history is very short. It originates from the end of the XIX century and concretely played a role starting in the Nineties (Kausikan 2014). IX And in any case they have to be consider as founded on "Confucian roots" (Rošker 2016, 163) . X See The ASEAN Charter 2015, 22. Clause 2 affirms "When Consensus cannot be achieved, the ASEAN Summit can decide how a specific decision can be made". XI "… concepts that Sukarno and the Indonesians introduced to Southeast Asian diplomacy. These terms, rooted in the traditional village societies of the Malay region, represent an approach to decision-making that emphasizes consensus and consultation" (Min Lee 2006). XII "However, "consensus does not assume that everyone must agree; it assumes at least that no one objects to the proposal". In other words, consensus does not require unanimity but rather leads to finding a common interest that could appeal to the whole" (Min Lee 2006). XIII "It endorses a view that "a leader should not act arbitrarily or impose his will, but rather make gentle suggestions of the path a community should follow, being careful always to consult all other participants fully and to take their views and feelings into consideration before delivering his synthesis conclusions" ( (Ratzinger 1990, 439-454) . XXI Buddhist thought has developed a peculiar position about the concept of "person". The doctrine of nonself or "insubstantiality" of the self Anātman (sanskrit) or Anatta (Pali) entails a view of the being as relation (and only as relation). Thus things and beings exist only as phenomenological interactions and never as "absolutes" (without relation to the rest). According to this view the person exist as a composition of five insubstantial aggregates (materiality, feeling, perception, mental formation and consciousness). Such a person disposes -some scholars don't agree on that point -of volitional action in deeds, words and thoughts, which may be morally good or bad considering that all actions are conditioned but not inescapably determined. Each person is free/responsible of his actions inside the co-dependency relation with society. A Buddhist idea of personal responsibility is present in the ASEAN integration debate. According to such a view there is a complementary role among human responsibilities and human rights. See Busquet 2007, 114-119 and Pasqualotto 2003, 42; Jones 2013 and Kooi Fong 2015. On the debate concerning Buddhism and free will see Repetti 2012, 130-197 . XXII The idea of "balance" finds a precedent in the "Joint Communique of the Twenty-Sixth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting of Singapore" of 23-24 July 1993 that affirmed "that freedom, progress and national stability are promoted by a balance between the rights of the individual and those of the community, through which many individual rights are realized, as provided for in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights…In this regard and in support of the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action of 25 June 1993, they agreed that ASEAN should also consider the establishment of an appropriate regional mechanism on human rights". The difference lies on the 1993 absence of any reference to the concept of "person", in the consequent passage from the "rights of the community" (1993) to the "responsibility of any person" (2012) and in a fundamental inversion of the accent on the issue of "development". In 1993 "Communique" development feed a criticism against the interference of western countries and international institution that sought to use human rights to condition the "development right" while in ADHR art. 35 affirms "..the lack of development may not be invoked to justify the violations on internationally recognized human rights". More generally if the text of 1993, especially on human rights, was all oriented in use the idea of balance to separate the space of ASEAN governments to that of international interference (with an accent on the relationship regarding the respect of national sovereignty and the protection and promotion of human rights) the one of 2012, birth in a different geopolitical context, operates more in trying to find a common ground among the different realities inside the ASEAN (art. 7) and among ASEAN (with its complex equilibrium) and the international community. It is not accidental that the relation among the respect of national sovereignty and the protection and promotion of 
